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The world has changed greatly in the four years since the September 11 th
terrorist attacks. Heightened security checks at airports, threat levels, terror alerts
in the United States, government watch lists, and terrorist attacks around the
world are constant reminders of the new risks we face. Americans have grown
more accustomed to the disruption and intrusions into our lives to help protect
our safety.
The events of September 1 1th have particularly affected U.S. financial
institutions. The attacks were a direct hit on the heart of New York's financial
district and inflicted a terrible toll on the securities industry. Many innocent lives
* Mr. Sorcher is Vice President and Associate General Counsel for the Securities Industry Association
in Washington, D.C. The Securities Industry Association ("SIA") brings together the shared interests of nearly
600 securities firms to accomplish common goals. SIA member firms (including investment banks, broker-
dealers, and mutual fund companies) are active in all U.S. and foreign markets and in all phases of corporate
and public finance.
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were lost and operations were thrown into disarray. However, the industry
showed remarkable resiliency by reopening bond markets only two days later,
and the equity markets the following Monday. In the four years since the attacks,
markets have returned to normal and financial institutions have undergone many
operational and system changes to conduct business in a post-September 1 1th
world.
The U.S. government has led the global campaign to tighten money
laundering restrictions and crack down on terrorist financing. The watershed
event in the United States was the passage of the USA Patriot Act of 2001' in the
weeks after September l1th. The legislation, while aimed at giving the
government new powers in the war on terrorism, imposes significant
requirements on broker-dealers and other financial institutions well beyond
traditional notions of anti-money laundering compliance. The long lasting
implication for broker-dealers, banks, and other financial institutions is that they
will be required to devote more resources than ever before to anti-money
laundering efforts. A recent study reported that spending on anti-money
laundering systems for banks increased an average of sixty-one percent in the
past three years, and is expected to increase an additional forty percent over the
next three years.
2
International organizations, foreign governments, and foreign financial
institutions have also stepped up efforts to combat terrorist financing and money
laundering. While the U.S. government has led the effort to make terrorist
financing a global priority, the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"), the
leading international organization that sets money laundering policy, has made
several important steps. Additionally, the United Nations ("UN") and European
Union ("EU") have also implemented several significant counter measures.
Despite the advances made in the past three years, money laundering and
terrorist financing continue to be a significant problem. Estimates of the amount
of money laundered each year are between two and five percent of the world's
gross domestic product ("GDP"), or roughly between $590 billion and $1.5
trillion.3 Regulators worldwide are now stepping up efforts to enforce money
laundering laws. In the United States, much attention has been focused on the
compliance failures at Riggs Bank, located in Washington, D.C. Riggs was
assessed a $25 million penalty--one of the largest penalties for a violation of the
Bank Secrecy Act. U.S. bank regulatory agencies have recently entered into
written agreements with ABN Amro Holding N.V., HSBC Bank, and Standard
Chartered Plc. for anti-money laundering compliance failures.
1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
2. See KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2004: How BANKS ARE UP TO THE
CHALLENGE 5 (2004) [hereinafter KPMG].
3. Vito Tanzi, Money Laundering and the International Financial System, INT. MONETARY FUND
(2005), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/cat/doctext.cfm?docno=WPIEA0551996.
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Enforcement actions have not been limited to the United States. The United
Kingdom's ("U.K.") Financial Services Authority, the primary financial
regulator, fined the Bank of Ireland $3.5 million for failing to take reasonable
steps to detect several high-risk cash transactions. Additionally, in September
2004, Japan's Financial Services Agency ordered Citigroup to terminate its
private banking operations for failing to implement procedures to prevent money
laundering and other violations of the country's banking laws. More recently,
AmSouth Bancorporation was assessed a $10 million penalty for anti-money
laundering compliance failures.
Part I of this article will discuss the new requirements under the Patriot Act
for U.S. financial institutions. The focus will be on the rules for securities firms,
although the requirements for banks are largely the same. Part H will review
significant international developments in anti-money laundering requirements.
Discussion will center on the primary international groups responsible for money
laundering policy. Lastly, Part III offers recommendations to improve anti-
money laundering regulation.
I. U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS
The Patriot Act provisions are far reaching and will require new levels of
compliance by all financial institutions.! The Patriot Act amends the Bank
Secrecy Act, the principle U.S. statute imposing anti-money laundering
compliance obligations on financial institutions. The Patriot Act focuses on
expanding due diligence and monitoring requirements, enhanced reporting
obligations, and financial intermediaries.5 The requirements include anti-money
laundering compliance programs, suspicious activity reporting, verification of
new accounts, certain recordkeeping for "correspondent accounts" with foreign
banks, special due diligence for correspondent and private banking accounts, and
prohibition of correspondent accounts with foreign shell banks.
Since the passage of the Patriot Act, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") and the federal financial
regulators have drafted extensive implementing regulations. These regulations
expand the categories of financial institutions that must possess basic anti-money
4. Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, broker-dealers were subject to certain provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act that imposed reporting and record keeping requirements. Since 1970, securities firms have been
required to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000 on a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR").
Similarly, these firms have been required to file reports relating to the physical transportation of currency or
bearer instruments in amounts over $10,000 into or outside of the United States on a Currency or Monetary
Instrument Transportation Report ("CMIR"). Since 1986, broker dealers, like other financial institutions, have
been subject to the criminal provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. Law No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207 (1986) ("MLCA"). Among other things, the MLCA established two anti-money laundering
criminal statutes that for the first time, made money laundering a crime in of itself. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957
(2000).
5. See Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, before the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Unites States Senate (Sept. 25, 2003) available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releasejs760.htm.
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laundering programs and report suspicious activity. Rules requiring anti-money
laundering programs are in effect for banks, securities firms, futures commission
merchants, introducing brokers in commodities, operators of credit card systems
and money services businesses. These rules have also been proposed for
investment advisors, commodity trading advisors, insurance companies, and
hedge funds. Currently, depository institutions, broker-dealers, mutual funds,
futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities, casinos,
and money services businesses are required to report suspicious activity.
Analogous reporting rules have been proposed for insurance companies. The
financial institutions that are required to establish customer identification and
verification procedures include banks, savings associations, credit unions, certain
non-federally regulated banks, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants and
introducing brokers in commodities and mutual funds.
Anti-money laundering compliance will continue to be a focus for financial
institutions as they grapple with new regulations and increased scrutiny from
regulators. This will be true in the United States and abroad. Resources will flow
towards account opening procedures, transaction monitoring, staff training, and
external reporting requirements.6
A. Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Programs
The Patriot Act required broker-dealers to establish comprehensive anti-
money laundering programs by April 24, 2002.7 The National Association of
Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange (collectively referred to as
SROs) issued rules that set forth the requirements for these programs.8 The rules
require: written internal policies, procedures, and internal controls to achieve
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act; the designation of a compliance officer;
an ongoing employee-training program for appropriate personnel; and an
independent audit by firm personnel or a qualified outside party to test the
programs. These anti-money laundering programs must be approved by a
member of senior management. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") also recognized that anti-money laundering compliance programs "will
evolve over time" as firms find "new ways to combat money laundering and to
detect suspicious activity." 9 The SROs' anti-money laundering program rules
also require firms to establish reasonable procedures and internal controls to
identify and report suspicious activity.
6. See KPMG, supra note 2.
7. Patriot Act, supra note 1, at § 352.
8. The NYSE (SR-NYSE-2002-10) and NASD (SR-NASD-2002-24) anti-money laundering rules were
issued by the SEC on April 22, 2002. Rel. No. 34-4378.
9. Id.
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B. Suspicious Activity Reporting
Recent press reports regarding money laundering compliance failures at
Riggs National Bank brought much attention to the need for financial institutions
to file suspicious activity reports ("SARs"). Riggs, a Washington, D.C. based
bank that made its name by providing banking services to Washington's foreign
embassies, was assessed a $25 million penalty for violations under the Bank
Secrecy Act by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network.' ° The inquiry into Riggs began after the September 11 th
terrorist attacks, when government investigators were looking at Saudi Arabian
accounts at the bank and discovered that Riggs failed to file numerous SARs.
Suspicious activity reporting is an important part of a firm's anti-money
laundering program. The SARs rule for broker-dealers was issued on July 1,
2002 by FinCEN, under section 356 of the Patriot Act." The rule, which took
effect on January 1, 2003, applies to any broker or dealer located within the
United States, and those firms registered as broker-dealers simply to permit the
sale of variable annuities. The rule also applies to activities of futures
commission merchants registered as broker-dealers that deal in securities
products over which the SEC, or any federal agency other than the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, has authority.
A broker-dealer must report a transaction (of at least $5,000) if it is
conducted or attempted by, at, or through the broker-dealer, and the broker-dealer
knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of
transactions): (1) involves funds derived from illegal activity, or is intended or
conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal
activity; (2) is designed, whether through structuring or other means, to evade the
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act; (3) has no business or apparent lawful
purpose, or is not the sort in which the particular customer would be expected to
engage, and the broker-dealer knows of no reasonable explanation after
examining the available facts; or (4) uses the broker-dealer to facilitate criminal
activity.'2 The reporting requirements apply even to transactions that do not
involve currency.
Suspicious activity reports must be filed on a "SAR-SF" form with FinCEN.
The SAR must be filed within thirty days of the broker-dealer becoming aware of
facts that may constitute a basis for filing. If a firm is unable to identify a suspect,
10. In the Matter of Riggs Bank, N.A., Matter No. 2004-01(May 13, 2004). Riggs was also assessed a
$25 million penalty by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. However, Riggs is only required to
make one payment of $25 million to the Department of Treasury. Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network. Id.
11. Prior to the Patriot Act, all broker-dealers that were subsidiaries of bank holding companies were
required to file SARs. In addition, many other broker-dealers, particularly the larger firms, filed SARs
voluntarily, even though they were under no legal obligation to do so.
12. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 66 Fed. Reg. 67,670 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103 (2001)).
399
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filing may be delayed for an additional thirty days in order to identify a suspect.
In situations involving violations that require immediate attention, such as
terrorist financing or ongoing money laundering schemes, the broker-dealer must
immediately notify the appropriate law enforcement agency by telephone in
addition to filing a SAR.
The rule requires firms to maintain copies of all SARs filed and the original
supporting documentation for five years from the date of the filing. In addition,
the supporting documentation must be made available to law enforcement or
authorized regulatory agencies and the SROs to ensure compliance with the rule.
Firms that file a SAR are prohibited from notifying any person involved in
the transaction of the SAR filing. This prohibition does not apply to requests
from law enforcement or regulatory agencies. 3 Lastly, firms are protected from
liability for reporting suspicious activity and for failing to disclose such
reporting.
4
C. Customer Identification and Verification
The United States Department of the Treasury and the SEC issued final rules
on May 9, 2003, requiring broker-dealers to establish procedures to verify the
identity of new accountholders, which is one of the most significant Patriot Act
provisions. 5 Similar rules were also issued by other federal regulatory agencies
for banks, credit unions, mutual funds, futures commission merchants, and
introducing brokers.
The rules require a broker-dealer to adopt a written Customer Identification
Program ("CIP") appropriate for its size and business, enabling it to form a
reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of the customer. The CIP must be
part of a firm's overall anti-money laundering compliance program required
under section 352 of the Patriot Act. A firm's program should be based on the
institution's assessment of the risks presented (e.g., its size, location, customer
base, types of accounts and transactions, methods of opening accounts, and types
of identifying information available). The CIP must include risk-based
procedures for verifying the identity of each customer if reasonable and
practicable, as described more fully below.
Firms are required to have procedures for opening an account that specify the
identifying information required from each customer. Firms are required, at a
minimum, to obtain the following information prior to opening an account: (1)
name; (2) date of birth (for individuals); (3) residential or business street address
for individuals, or principal place of business, local office or other physical
location for persons other than individuals; and (4) identification number - for a
13. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2005).
14. Id. § 5318(g)(3).
15. See Patriot Act, supra note 1, § 326.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 18
U.S. person, a taxpayer identification number ("TIN"); for a non-U.S. person, a
TIN, a passport number and country of issuance, an alien identification card
number or the number and country of issuance of any other government-issued
document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph or
similar safeguard. Firms may have procedures for opening an account for a
customer that has applied for, but not received, a taxpayer identification number.
Broker-dealers are required to have procedures for verifying the identity of
each customer within a reasonable amount of time before or after the account is
opened. The CIP must specify when the institution will verify a customer's
identity through documents, including identifying the documents that will be
used, and when the firm will verify through non-documentary methods, or a
combination of both. Non-documentary methods may include contacting the
customer, comparing information from the customer with information from a
consumer reporting agency, public database, or other source, and checking
references. The CIP must also address situations when the broker-dealer should
not open an account, when an account should be closed because the firm is
unable to verify the customer, and when a SAR should be filed.
A firm must also have procedures for making and maintaining records of all
information obtained in verifying a customer's identity. The records must include
all identifying information about the customer and a description of any original
document relied upon in verifying identity. The records must also include a
description of the methods and results of any measures undertaken to verify the
customer's identity, including the resolution of any discrepancies discovered.
Identifying customer information must be maintained for five years after the
account is closed. In addition, records relating to how a firm verified the identity
of a customer must be maintained for five years after the records are made.
The rules also require financial institutions to adopt procedures for
determining whether a customer appears on any list of known or suspected
terrorists or terrorist organizations issued by any federal government agency and
designated as such by the Treasury in consultation with the federal functional
regulators. Firms will receive notification regarding the lists that must be
consulted for purposes of this provision. Procedures must also ensure that the
institution follows all federal Directives issued in connection with such lists.
Firms must also have procedures for providing customers with adequate notice
that the institution is requesting information to verify their identities. The final
rule includes sample language that a firm may follow.
D. Correspondent and Private Account Due Diligence
Of all the rules rolled out by the Treasury, those that perhaps may impose the
greatest burden-at least on those firms with substantial international clientele-
are the due diligence procedures under section 312 of the Patriot Act to detect
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money laundering for private banking accounts and corresponding accounts for
aliens and offshore banks.1 6 The proposed rule requires "covered financial
institutions" to establish: (1) due diligence policies, procedures, and controls to
detect money laundering through correspondent accounts with foreign covered
financial institutions; (2) enhanced due diligence policies, procedures, and
controls for correspondent accounts for certain foreign banks with offshore
banking licenses, and for all banks licensed by jurisdictions that have been
determined to pose a high risk of money laundering; and (3) due diligence
policies, procedures, and controls for accounts for foreign "private banking"
clients, including "senior foreign political figures."'7
The Treasury's proposed rule defines a "correspondent account" and a
"foreign financial institution" so broadly that the rule could be interpreted to
cover virtually all accounts U.S. financial institutions have with foreign financial
institutions. For example, correspondent accounts are defined as accounts that
"receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of... or handle other financial
transactions" for a foreign financial institution.'8 Because the broad definitions in
the proposed rule cover an array of accounts used to conduct ordinary business
transactions with foreign financial institutions, U.S. institutions would thus be
expending resources on accounts that do not raise "red flags."
In response to issues raised by the SIA and others in comment letters, the
Treasury postponed the issuance of a final rule under section 312. Instead, the
Treasury issued an interim rule advising firms of their compliance obligations
until the issuance of a final rule. Under the interim rule, broker-dealers are
required only to comply with the enhanced due diligence requirements for private
banking clients.' 9 For private banking accounts that meet this definition, pending
the adoption of a final rule, the interim rule provides that firms should focus on
those accounts that present a high risk of money laundering. The due diligence
for these accounts should be consistent with guidance for private banking issued
by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury.
E. Shell Bank Prohibitions
The rule regarding foreign shell banks implements two key provisions
(sections 313 and 319(b)) of the Patriot Act. Section 313 prohibits U.S. financial
institutions from providing correspondent accounts to foreign shell banks, and
requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that correspondent accounts are
16. 67 Fed. Reg. 37,736 (May 30, 2002) (implementing section 312 of the Patriot Act and proposed on
May 30, 2002).
17. 67 Fed. Reg. 37,743 (May 30, 2002).
18. 67 Fed. Reg. 37,742 (May 30, 2002).
19. 67 Fed. Reg. 37,738 (May 30, 2002). A private banking account is defined as an account of at least
$1 million, for one or more individuals who have a direct or beneficial interest in the account, and managed by
an officer, employee or agent of a financial institution "acting as a liaison between the financial institution and
the direct or beneficial owner of the account." Id.
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not used indirectly for foreign shell banks. Section 319(b) requires financial
institutions that provide correspondent accounts to foreign banks to keep records
of the foreign banks' owners and agents, who will accept service of legal process
in the United States.
The final rule provides that a broker-dealer:
Shall not establish a correspondent account in the United States for, or on
behalf of, a foreign shell bank;
Take reasonable steps to ensure that any correspondent account
established by a broker-dealer in the United States for a foreign bank is
not being used by the foreign bank to indirectly provide banking services
to a foreign shell bank;
Maintain records-for all correspondent accounts in the United States for
a foreign bank-that identify the owners of each foreign bank whose
shares are not publicly traded and the foreign bank's U.S. agent
authorized to accept service of legal process. °
Firms are permitted to use a certification form, provided in the rule, to
comply with the shell bank prohibition, and the requirement to identify a foreign
bank's owners and agent for service of process.2" The certification must be
obtained at least once every three years.22 Firms have thirty days from when an
account is opened to obtain the certification. If a certification is not obtained
within the required time, a broker-dealer must close all correspondent accounts
with the foreign bank within a commercially reasonable time.
F. Sharing of Infonnation
The Treasury issued a final rule under section 314 of the Patriot Act, which is
aimed at encouraging greater cooperation among financial institutions,
regulators, and law enforcement in efforts against money laundering and
terrorism financing.
Under the rule, FinCEN, acting on behalf of a federal law enforcement
agency investigating money laundering or terrorist activity, may require any
financial institution to search its records to determine whether the financial
institution maintains or has maintained accounts for, or has engaged in
transactions with, named individuals, entities, or organizations. Firms must
search their records for any current account and any account maintained for a
named suspect during the preceding twelve months. A firm is required to search
20. 31 C.F.R. § 103.177(a) (2005).
21. Id. § 103.177(b).
22. Id.
403
2005 / Lost In Implementation
for transactions that are required to be recorded and are conducted during the
preceding six months by, or on behalf of, a named suspect.23 This process has
resulted in 607 Grand Jury subpoenas, 129 Administrative subpoenas or
summons, 1,285 new counts identified, and eleven search warrants.24
The rule also establishes procedures for voluntary information sharing between
or among financial institutions. The sharing of information must be for the purpose
of identifying and reporting activities that may involve money laundering or
terrorist activity. A firm that shares information pursuant to the rule is protected
under the Patriot Act from any liability for such sharing, or for any failure to
provide notice of such sharing.
A financial institution that intends to share information under the rule must file
a notice with FinCEN using the form set forth in the rule. An institution is required
to submit a new form to FinCEN each year, and must take reasonable steps to
verify that the institution with which it intends to share information has also filed
the required notice with FinCEN. FinCEN maintains a list of institutions that have
submitted the required notice and are thus qualified to share information.
G. Office of Foreign Assets Control
Although not under the Patriot Act, financial institutions are also prohibited
under U.S. law from entering into transactions with "Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons." These prohibited transactions come under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC").
25
OFAC administers and enforces U.S. economic and trade sanctions against
targeted foreign countries, terrorism sponsoring organizations, and international
narcotics traffickers. At present, OFAC administers comprehensive sanctions and
embargo programs involving Cuba, Iran, and Sudan.26 OFAC also enforces
prohibitions against transactions with designated terrorists, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, and named foreign persons who engage in activities related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. OFAC acts by imposing controls on
transactions and freezing foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction. OFAC's actions
are authorized pursuant to presidential wartime and national emergency powers
and specific legislation.
23. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FINANCIAL CRIME'S ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 314(A) FACT SHEET
(2004). Through September 2004, 340 (of which 123 related to terrorist financing and 217 related to money
laundering) requests have been processed under the Patriot Act § 314(a) by ten different Federal agencies. Id.
These requests identified 2,402 subjects. In responding, financial institutions had 16,405 positive matches and
797 inconclusive matches. Id.
24. Id.
25. OFAC is within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the Treasury Department.
Information about this agency is available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/.
26. OFAC also administers several additional programs of lesser scope or severity than these programs.
Id.
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OFAC regulations apply to all financial institutions in the United States and
require the identification of any transaction and property subject to a U.S.
sanction. OFAC regulations also apply to all U.S. citizens and permanent resident
aliens, wherever they are located, entities and organizations located in the United
States, and overseas branches and subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Financial
institutions must "block" or "freeze" accounts, assets, and obligations of blocked
entities and individuals. Financial institutions must report such blockings within
ten days to OFAC and file a comprehensive annual report on blocked property.
Securities firms are also prohibited from dealing in securities issued from
targeted countries and governments.
OFAC administers a master list of "Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons" that targets members of foreign government regimes and
networks of companies or other entities whose activities are inimical to the
United States. Financial institutions are prohibited from conducting transactions,
providing services, or having other dealings with persons or entities designated as
such.
In combating terrorist financing, the Treasury may designate terrorist
organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the President's Executive
Order 13224. Those on the terrorist list are known as Specially Designated
Global Terrorists or Specially Designated Terrorists. With respect to drug
trafficking, the Treasury acts under the authority of the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
to administer and enforce the provisions of law relating to the identification and
sanctioning of major foreign narcotic traffickers. These persons are known as
Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers.
II. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
REQUIREMENTS
A. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering is the intergovernmental
organization dedicated to developing international money laundering standards.
FATF was established in 1989 by the G-7 summit in Paris. FATF's primary purposes
develop and promote policies to combat money laundering and the financing of
terrorism.
FATF monitors members' progress in implementing anti-money laundering
measures, reviews money laundering, terrorist financing techniques and counter
measures, and lastly, promotes the adoption and implementation of anti-money
laundering measures globally. FATF coordinates with other international bodies
27. The U.S. Department of Treasury identifies targets in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Narcotics and Drug Section of the Department of Justice.
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in performing its mission. FATF functions as informal bodies of experts, thus, its
policies do not have any directly binding legal force.
The number of FATF member-states has increased since 1990 from the
original sixteen members to now include thirty-one countries and territories from
North and South America, Europe, and Asia, and two regional organizations (the
Commission of the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council).2 ' There
are also several FATF-style regional bodies, which strengthen FATF's approach
and spread standards to non-members countries.
As part of a plan to help member countries fight money laundering, in 1990
the FATF issued its Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering ("Forty
Recommendations"). The Forty Recommendations represent the international
standard for anti-money laundering principles and have been endorsed or adopted
by many international bodies.
Although not binding, the Forty Recommendations have been implemented
by many nations throughout the world. They include recommendations that
countries: criminalize the laundering of illicit proceeds of criminal activity;
require financial institutions to develop anti-money laundering programs and
report suspicious activity; exchange information with other countries relating to
suspicious transactions; encourage cooperative investigations among the various
countries; and recognize money laundering as an extraditable offense.
The Forty Recommendations were initially revised in 1996 to reflect changes
in money laundering trends. In 2003, FATF completed a thorough revision of the
Forty Recommendations after reviewing comments from countries, the financial
sector, and other interested parties. 9 The review sought comment on whether
changes were needed on customer due diligence, suspicious activity reporting,
beneficial ownership, and the application of anti-money laundering obligations to
non-financial businesses and professions. FATF has also issued Interpretive
Notes that clarify certain of the Forty Recommendations.
In 2000, FATF developed its Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
("NCCT") program to determine those jurisdictions that undermine the global
effort to combat money laundering. The goal of the program is to reduce the
vulnerabilities of the international financial system to money laundering by
ensuring that all countries adopt and implement systems to counter money
28. The Member States of FATF are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong Kong, China,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and United States.
29. See Letter from SIA, the Futures Industry Association and the Investment Company (Aug. 30,
2002), available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/regulatory/FATFpaper.doc. The Securities
Industry Association submitted a comment letter with two other trade groups making a number of suggestions
on how the FATF's Forty Recommendations, which are tailored primarily for the banking industry, could be
revised for the securities and related industries. One suggestion was to recognize the importance-in
appropriate circumstances-of relying on intermediaries to perform due diligence. Id.
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laundering. In February 2000, FATF published its initial report on NCCTs that
established twenty-five criteria for determining NCCTs falling into these four
categories: loopholes in financial regulations; obstacles raised by other regulatory
requirements; obstacles to international cooperation; and inadequate resources for
preventing and detecting money laundering activities. After a review, in June
2000, FATF published its first list naming fifteen jurisdictions as NCCTs.3 °
In determining whether jurisdictions should be removed from the NCCT list,
FATF must make a determination that the previously identified deficiencies have
been addressed. In general, the jurisdiction must have enacted legislation and
regulations, and the regulations must be implemented and enforced. In 2002,
eight jurisdictions were removed from the list: Hungary, Israel, Lebanon, St.
Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, Marshall Islands, Niue, and Russia. Since then, other
jurisdictions have been removed. Today the list includes Mynamar, Nauru and
Nigeria.3
After the September 11 th attacks, the United States and other countries called
for an immediate worldwide effort to prevent the use of the international
financial system to finance terrorism. At a special plenary session held on
October 29-30, 2001, FATF expanded its focus beyond money laundering to
include efforts to combat terrorist financing. FATF issued Eight Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,32 which are the new international
standards for combating terrorist financing.
The Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing call on countries
to, among other things: implement UN resolutions relating to terrorist financing;
criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations;
freeze funds or other assets of terrorists; require financial institutions and other
businesses to report any suspicious activity where it appears that funds are
connected to terrorist activities; and ensure that entities, especially non-profit
organizations and charities, cannot be misused to finance terrorism.33
FATF monitors member countries in implementing the FATF recommendations
through self-assessments and mutual evaluations. The self-assessment process
involves each member providing information each year on a standard
questionnaire that is addressed to their level of compliance. FATF then analyses
and compiles this information and makes an assessment as to the extent the
recommendations have been implemented by individual countries and by FATF
as a group. Through the mutual evaluation process, each country is examined by
30. The report named the Bahamas, Cayman Islands. Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon,
Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines as having critical deficiencies in their anti-money laundering regimes or a demonstrated
unwillingness to cooperate in anti-money laundering efforts.
31. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Current List of Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories, available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/ncct-en.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
32. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report, available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/l3/1/34328160.pdf.
33. Id. at 8.
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the FATF during an on-site visit conducted by a team of experts from other
member countries. A report is then prepared assessing the extent to which the
country has implemented an effective system to counter money laundering. For
those members not in compliance, FATF's policy is to undertake a graduated
approach through peer pressure put on member governments aimed at convincing
them to tighten their systems.
FATF has also adopted a best practices paper for combating the abuse of
non-profit organizations. 14 At its October 2004 session, the FATF is likely to
approve international standards on cash couriers who carry money across borders
to finance terrorism.3
B. European Union
The EU's efforts to combat money laundering were launched in 1991. In
June of that year, the Commission of the European Community ("Community")
published its first Directive (Directive 91/308/EEC) aimed at preventing the use
of the financial system for money laundering purposes. The Community's 1991
Directive, which closely followed FATF's Forty Recommendations and the
recommendations of other international groups, regarded anti-money laundering
regimes principally as a tool to combat illegal narcotics trafficking. The
Directive, among other things, obliged financial institutions to identify their
customers, keep various records, establish certain policies and procedures, and
report to relevant authorities suspicions of money laundering activities. The
Directive is binding, and those EU Member States that fail to comply can be
compelled through the legal process to bring their systems in line.36
Despite the 1991 Directive, concerns surfaced that the problem of money
laundering was growing within the EU and that the focus of the 1991 Directive
on illegal drug-related activities was too narrow. In 1998, the Commission issued
a report recommending an expansion of existing anti-money laundering
measures. 7 Reform efforts culminated in the adoption of a new Directive in the
fall of 2001, soon after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.
The 2001 Directive (Directive 2001/97/EC), which amended the 1991
Directive, covered a wider range of predicate or underlying criminal offenses,
including organized criminal activities and corruption. This action conformed to
recommendations made by the FATF in the late 1990s. The 2001 Directive also
34. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES (SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VII) (2002).
35. FATF Expected to Approve International Standards on Cash Couriers, BNA, INC. DAILY REPORT
FOR EXECUTIVES (October 1, 2004).
36. Directive 91/308/EEC, available at http://europa.eu.int/indexen.htm.. The EU Directives provide
the EU Member States with a detailed set of mandatory measures to take against money laundering. Id.
37. See Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and Counsel on the Implementation of
the Money Laundering Directive, COM(98)401.
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expanded the range of institutions that were subject to due diligence and
suspicious activity reporting requirements. The 2001 Directive more clearly
covered currency exchange offices and money transmitters than the 1991
Directive, and imposed anti-money laundering obligations on certain non-
financial professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, when they engaged in
financial and corporate transactions.
The EU also reacted swiftly to the events of September 11 th by introducing
measures against a terrorist threat. The measures included the Council
Recommendation on Cooperation in the Fight Against the Financing of
Terrorism (Joint Position of the Council of 27 December 2001). In addition, UN
Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1373 (against the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden and other terrorists) were passed and applied by regulation
within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
On June 30, 2004 the Commission proposed a new Directive (the "Third
Anti-Money Laundering Directive"), designed to supplant and replace the prior
two Directives." The new proposed Directive specifically covers terrorist
financing and provides for more detailed customer identification and verification
procedures. This will involve not only mandatory implementation of the new
FATF Forty Recommendations, but will create clearer and more detailed
regulations in order to ensure uniform and manageable implementation.
39
The proposed Directive generally includes measures that are designed to
keep EU laws in line with recommendations made in 2003 by the FATF.4° The
proposal contains forty-three separate articles, some of which are summarized
below.
Article One defines money laundering specifically to cover terrorist
financing. Article Two applies the Directive to a wide range of financial and non-
financial intermediaries, including life insurance firms and trust and service
companies (which are defined to include entities that provide incorporation,
trustee, and other business formation and facilitation services). In addition, this
Article makes clear that the Directive covers all persons trading in goods or
services who accept cash payments above C15,000.
Article Seven of the proposed Directive sets forth risk-based due diligence
procedures that institutions subject to the Directive must follow to "know their
customers' and understand their customers" financial and business activities.
38. Press Release by European Commission, Money Laundering: Commission Proposes to Update and
Improve Directive, (June 30, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=I
P/04/832&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
39. See Adoption of Anti-Money Laundering Directive Will Strike a Blow Against Crime and Terrorism,
(June 7, 2005) available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/682&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gulLanguage=fr. Subsequent to the writing of this article, the Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive was adopted.
40. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prevention of
the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, including Terrorist Financing,
COM(04)448.
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These procedures require, among other things, taking "reasonable measures" to
identify underlying beneficial owners and, where trust and other similar
arrangements are involved, taking "reasonable measures to understand the
ownership and control structures." Article Eight makes clear that due diligence
efforts should be undertaken at the outset of the customer relationship and, for
existing accounts, "at appropriate times... on a risk-sensitive basis."
Article Ten permits individual EU Member States to allow institutions that
are covered by the Directive in those Member States to adopt simplified due
diligence procedures in situations involving a reduced risk of money laundering.
Article eleven requires enhanced due diligence procedures in certain higher risk
situations, such as when a customer is not physically present for identification
purposes. This article also prohibits correspondent relationships with shell banks.
Articles Twelve through Sixteen contain various provisions that allow
institutions covered by the Directive to rely on other parties to carry out their due
diligence obligations. In general, reliance is permitted when a customer has been
referred by a third party that is subject to either (a) mandatory professional
registration requirements, or (b) due diligence and recordkeeping requirements
"equivalent to those laid down" by the Directive.
Articles Eighteen through Twenty-Four provide for suspicious activity
reporting to appropriate authorities, and Article Twenty-Five prohibits informing
customers or third parties when suspicious activities are reported. Articles
Twenty-Six through Twenty-Nine generally establish a five-year recordkeeping
requirement for documents and information covered by the Directive.
Article Twenty-Seven requires institutions covered by the Directive to apply
customer due diligence and recordkeeping measures "at least equivalent" to those
required by the Directive to their branches and majority-owned subsidiaries that
are located in non-EU countries.
Finally, as to enactment of the proposed new Directive, under the
Commission's legislative process, the proposed Directive will be sent to the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, which scrutinize, amend, and
adopt proposed legislation, such as this Directive. The Dutch Presidency of the
Council has indicated that it intends to give priority to enacting this proposed
Directive.4'
C. The United Nations
Through the United Nations, the international community has made several
significant initiatives aimed at money laundering and terrorist financing. The
terrorist financing initiatives have occurred largely as a result of the September
11 th attacks. A summary of significant United Nations' Convention Resolutions
related to money laundering and terrorist financing follows.
41. See supra note 39.
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On December 9, 1999 the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. 42 The Convention
requires states to criminalize the collection or provision of funds with the
knowledge or intent that they be used to conduct certain terrorist activity. Article
eighteen of the Convention encourages implementation of a number of FATF's
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering, including prohibiting accounts
held by unidentified parties, verifying the identity of real parties to transactions,
and obtaining proof of incorporation. Article eighteen also requires parties to
cooperate in the efforts against terrorist financing by adapting their home
legislation to prevent the commission of certain identified offenses. The
Convention also encourages states to require financial institutions to: report
complex or large transactions or unusual patterns of transactions that have no
apparent lawful purpose; maintain records for five years; monitor the physical
cross-border transfer of cash; and supervise money transmission agencies. The
Convention also addresses the exchange of information.
The Convention entered into force on April 9, 2002. Sixty-four states had
become parties to the Convention as of December 31, 2002 and seventy-five
others had signed but not ratified the Convention. The United States became a
party on June 26, 2002.
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was the first
legally binding multilateral treaty specifically aimed at transnational organized
crime. The Convention opened for signature on December 12-14, 2000, in
Palermo, Italy. The United States and 124 other countries became signatories.
Article seven requires each state to establish comprehensive regulatory systems
in order to deter and detect money laundering. The Convention also encourages
each state to develop a financial intelligence unit to act as the center for the
collection and analysis of information relating to money laundering.43 Also
required is cooperation among the parties, including the exchange of information,
in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering offenses.
On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373
requiring states to take specific action to combat terrorism." The Resolution
requires states to: (1) freeze, without delay, funds, financial assets, and other
economic resources of any individuals or entities who participate in any way in
the commission of terrorist acts; (2) prohibit any person within their territories
from making any funds available for the benefit of persons who attempt or
commit terrorist acts; (3) ensure that the state's domestic laws treat terrorist acts
as serious criminal offenses; and (4) deny safe haven to anyone who participates
42. See International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR,
54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (1999). The Convention was open for signature from
January 10, 2000 to December 31, 2001. Id.
43. These financial intelligence units would be comparable to FinCEN.
44. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Meeting (2001), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/NOI/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdfOpenElement.
2005 / Lost In Implementation
in the financing or planning of terrorist acts and to ensure that such persons are
brought to justice. Resolution 1373 also ensures that states treat terrorist acts as
serious criminal offenses with just punishment to coincide with the seriousness of
the crime, as well as, deny safe haven to those who financially facilitate terrorist
acts. Member States are called upon to fully cooperate in exchanging information
in order to prevent such acts.
The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee was established under Resolution
1373 to monitor implementation of the Resolution and to review reports from
states on steps they have taken on implementation. As of the end of 2002, 181
out of 191 Member States had submitted progress reports.
Lastly, under several other UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR
1267,1390, and 1455) UN Member States are required to implement measures
against all individuals and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, Al Qaida,
and the Taliban. Such measures include: asset freezing, travel restrictions, and an
arms embargo. Member States are required to impose those measures against the
individuals and entities associated with Al Qaida and the Taliban, who are placed
on a list maintained by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. Limited exceptions to
the asset freeze provisions are permitted under certain circumstances.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION
Since the Patriot Act was enacted over three years ago, great strides have
been made in the battle against money laundering and terrorist financing. New
rules have vastly increased the difficulty of laundering illicit funds. A global
campaign is well underway to shut down the flow of funds to terrorists.
Securities firms, banks, and other financial institutions have implemented new
policies, procedures, and systems to detect illegal activities more effectively and
to help government officials track down the perpetrators.
As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in the reporting of suspicious
activity since September l1th. The U.S. Treasury Department reports that
financial institutions filed 2,655 SARs relating to possible terrorist financing in
the eighteen months following the terrorist attacks. Although the number of
SARs filed relating to terrorism has decreased since then, 459 SARs connected to
terrorism were filed by depository institutions in the last six months of 2003."5 In
general, the number of SARs filed by depository institutions in 2003 was 453
percent higher than those filed in 1996.' In 2003, broker-dealers filed 4,267 SAR
forms.
47
Other kinds of reporting have also increased. Financial institutions have
reported 16,405 possible matches (of which only 878 were inconclusive) in their
45. The SAR Activity Review, BY THE NUMBERS, Issue 2 (May 2004).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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records of parties suspected by law enforcement of money laundering or terrorist
financing. 8 In addition, law enforcement has designated over 330 terrorists or
terrorist supporters. Approximately $200 million has been frozen or seized
worldwide.49
These statistics demonstrate that much can be achieved when the financial
services industry works in concert with law enforcement, but clearly more needs
to be done. Only recently, Stuart Levey, Undersecretary of the Treasury for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated that European officials have been
slow to take action against entities designated by the United States as funding the
terrorist group Hamas.50 The efforts of the United States and her allies must
compliment and support each other and there cannot be any lapses.
Three achievable recommendations that will make financial institutions and
regulators more effective in the war on money laundering and terrorist financing
are: (A) increased coordination among regulators, both domestically and on an
international level; (B) increased reliance on regulated financial intermediaries;
and (C) more information sharing by law enforcement with industry to assist in
detecting suspicious activity. These three recommendations are discussed below.
A. Increased Coordination Among Regulators, Both Domestically and On An
International Level
First, we need increased coordination among regulators, both here and
internationally. This is necessary to avoid duplication of efforts and to harmonize
the various anti-money laundering requirements. A recent Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") Report found the government's National Money
Laundering Strategy has had mixed results "guiding the coordination of federal
law enforcement agencies to combat money laundering."5' The GAO Report
noted that various agencies had different priorities in their efforts addressed at
money laundering. Such an approach cannot be successful. Instead, coordination
must be improved, and to do that, regulators must cooperate to achieve effective
regulation. In addition, each financial regulatory agency should have a designated
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing office to centralize its own
48. See FinCEN, supra note 23. These reports are in response to requests from FinCEN under section
314(a) of the Patriot Act. Through the process established under 314(a), FinCEN is able to send requests to
more than 15,000 financial institutions to attempt to locate accounts and transactions of persons suspected of
being involved in money laundering or terrorism. Id.
49. See Testimony of Daniel L. Glaser, Director, Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crime before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources (May 11, 2004).
50. Campion Walsh, U.S. Treasury Worried By Hamas Funders Allowed in Europe, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Sept. 29, 2004, available at http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?
StorylD=2004092916030012&Take=l.
51. U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the
National Strategy, GAO-03-813 (Wash. D.C. Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d03813.
html.
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activities. Our government must also work multi-laterally to develop international
anti-money laundering standards which promote cooperation and efficacy, but at the
same time respect issues of nationality and the unique concerns of particular
jurisdictions. In short, if the global campaign against money laundering is to be
successful, national standards must be harmonized and cannot be in conflict.
B. Reliance on Financial Intermediaries
If we are to be successful in the fight against dirty money, U.S. regulators
must recognize the anti-money laundering compliance performed by reputable
foreign firms. As it now stands under the Patriot Act, U.S. financial institutions
cannot rely on the United Kingdom or other European financial institutions to
help screen for money laundering.
U.S. rules must allow reliance on the financial institutions of our European
allies because of the increasing number of transactions conducted in the global
marketplace. This coordinated effort would help achieve the goals of the Patriot
Act, which requires broker-dealers, banks, and other financial institutions to
devote more resources than ever before to anti-money laundering efforts.
Securities firms today conduct many different kinds of business with financial
institutions acting on behalf of their own third-party clients. Transactions involving
these "financial intermediaries" are commonplace and include purchases or
redemptions of mutual-fund shares conducted through a broker or other
intermediary, clearing trades for another broker's customers, and executing
transactions of large institutions investing funds for third-parties. The financial
intermediaries involved in these transactions are typically well-known financial
institutions that are subject to the Patriot Act or, in the case of foreign
institutions, to similarly comprehensive laws and regulations.
By being able to depend on a financial intermediary to perform compliance,
U.S. firms can avoid duplication, and focus their resources on those areas that
present the highest risk. Financial intermediaries are best situated to perform
customer identification and due diligence because they interact with their clients,
and can obtain the necessary information directly from them. But the Patriot Act
rules--despite the best efforts of the regulators-do not permit reliance on
foreign financial institutions, and only permit limited reliance on specified types
of U.S. financial institutions. U.S. firms, therefore, must repeat the screening
already conducted by their European counterparts.
In contrast, the EU's Directives and the U.K.'s rules do not require firms to
repeat the due diligence performed by financial intermediaries. For example, the
EU permits reliance when a customer is introduced to a financial or credit
institution by a third-party that is also subject to the EU Directive. In the United
Kingdom., when a customer is brought to a financial institution by a U.S.
financial institution, a second round of customer identification generally is not
required by the U.K. institution.
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U.S. broker-dealers and other financial institutions should be permitted to
build on the efforts of reputable foreign intermediaries, rather than replicating
them. The anti-money laundering and terrorist financing compliance performed
in the United Kingdom is comparable to that done here, and there is no reason to
think their review is any less effective.
This is not to say that U.S. firms should be able to blindly rely on foreign
firms. Firms would first have to consider the reputation of the intermediary,
whether it is regulated and where it is located. For example, firms would have to
determine whether a financial intermediary not subject to Patriot Act-type
requirements is a legitimate, reputable entity that has adequate policies and
procedures. To rely on intermediaries from lesser regulated and thus higher risk
countries, U.S. firms would need to conduct even more detailed scrutiny and may
require an independent review demonstrating that the intermediaries' policies are
adequate. Reliance may be altogether inappropriate when known information
calls the foreign firm into question.
C. Information Sharing by Law Enforcement With Industry
Third, there must be more meaningful information-sharing by regulators with
the industry to assist in detecting suspicious activity. Up until now, efforts made
by law enforcement in the United States, while helpful, are inadequate. Through
worldwide intelligence, the government can help focus industry on the areas that
pose the greatest risk. The industry's ability to identify suspicious activity would
benefit significantly from the many sources of information available to
government such as known havens for money laundering, the names of known
shell banks, and any trends or transactions in money laundering or the financing
of terrorism. In addition, there should be improved coordination in the industry's
efforts to identify accounts or transactions with "senior foreign political figures,"
which have been identified by the government as posing a higher risk of money
laundering. The government is in a better position to identify these persons, and
doing so would permit the industry to focus more of its resources on monitoring
accounts, rather than trying to prepare its own list of such persons.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the world has changed greatly in the four years since the terrorist
attacks, some things remain the same. The number of people killed on September
I lth and the devastation inflicted remain forever etched into our memories.
Moreover, that day made very clear who the enemy is and the threat posed to our
country and financial system. We now know that terrorism presents new threats
to our society and economy.
The war against terrorist financing and money laundering presents enormous
challenges given the significant amount of money that flows though our financial
system from all parts of the world. Advances in technology and the widespread
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use of the Internet have created opportunities for those who wish to harm us-
regardless of where they are located. The result is that our financial institutions
must now ferret through the thousands upon thousands of daily transactions to
find suspicious activity, potentially as small as the hundred dollar transactions
used by the September 11 terrorists.
While our achievements are significant, the task at hand is great. The Patriot
Act has given the industry and law enforcement tools to combat these evils. The
world community has also stepped up protective efforts. However, the lessons
learned to date demonstrate the need for more coordinated efforts between law
enforcement and industry. We cannot afford to waste resources by duplicating
the efforts of reputable financial institutions in allied and friendly countries. To
be successful, we must work hand-in-hand with our allies.
